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FOREWORD
This document is one of a series prepared in accordance with Contract NAS9-11160, Modification No. 11S, Space Shuttle System Program
Definition Study, Phase B Extension Contract. Listed below are the documents required by Data Line Items 6, 8 and 9 of the contract.
CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
Volume I - Executive Summary
Volume II - Technical Report
Volume IIa - Payload Impact Analysis On Orbiter Subsystems
(NASA TD GAC-1 1)
Volume III - Mass Properties Report
Volume IV - Cost and Schedule Report
PRUEDING PAGE BLAjN NOT F ILM
STUDY PARTICIPATION
The Space Shuttle System Program Definition Study, Phase B Extension Contract was conducted jointly by the Grumman Aerospace
Corporation, the Boeing Company, and their associates. To assure consistency of results, Grumman and Boeing worked together closely, particularly
in the areas of system design, costing, and concept/configuration evaluation. In addition to the overall study management, Grumman concentrated
on Orbiter and HO Tank design, analysis of mated configuration, and development test planning. Boeing concentrated on Booster design, ground
operations, and maintenance planning.
In concurrence with NASA's encouragement for the inclusion of Shuttle applicable technologies from the international industrial community,
Grumman continued its working relationship with two major European aerospace firms, Dassault of France and Dornier of W. Germany.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This Phase B Extension Study final report is submitted to NASA to aid characteristics used during previous study periods. The requirements base-
in the selection of a low cost shuttle system for design and development. The line for the final study period is compared to the December 15 set of require-
objective of the final study period was to examine and penetrate the major ments and characteristics in Figure 2. Of particular interest are:
technical and cost issues affecting the choice of:
Squid propulsion recoverable or solid propulsion expendable Eliminati n f th  phas  development (Mark I/Mark II) concept
* Liquid propulsion recoverable or solid propulsion expendable
booster * Introduction of a 14x45 payload bay orbiter to deliver 45K due
* Parallel burn/parallel mount or series burn/tandem mount con- east payload up, 25K down
figurations and * Specification of three space shuttle main engines,(SSME's) at 472K
* Payload weight and payload bay size of the orbiter vacuum thrust each for the orbiter
* Introduction of reusable space insulation (RSI) on the first pro-
duction orbiter
In accordance with NASA direction (MSC telegraphic message LV-
10482-7, dated 7 January 1972) Grumman baselined a series burn system
comprised of an orbiter with a standard (15x60) payload bay and a recover- Our approach to the study and evaluation of the 16 configurations compris-
able liquid propulsion pressure-fed booster, and used this system as the ing the base of the pyramid of Figure 1 was as follows:
standard to which we compared the cost and performance of all other con-
figurations studied. The complete matrix of program options evaluated in * In order to assess the relative merits of liquid propellant/recoverable
this final study period is shown in Figure 1, with the above described base- versus solid propellant/expendable boosters, the technical issues
line in heavy outline on the left of the figure. Of the alternates to the base- affecting this appraisal were explored using the 15x60 payload bay
line, the major study emphasis was placed on a parallel burn configuration orbiter in conjunction with (a) a liquid propellant, pressure-fed
employing solid rocket boosters (both 120" and 156" solids were considered) booster in a series burn, tandem arrangement and (b) 156" and 120"
and an orbiter resized for a 14x45 payload bay. Considerable effort was solid rocket boosters in parallel burn, parallel mounting arrange-
also devoted to a series configuration utilizing a pump-fed booster and par- ments
allel/SRM configuration with a standard payload bay size orbiter. A varia-
tion of the baseline system, incorporating swing engines rather than fixed * The effect of payload weight and payload bay size reduction was
engines on the orbiter, was considered primarily in conjunction with a study examined in a three-step process:
of pad abort capability and will be discussed in the section dealing with that
subject. - We first designed a small payload bay orbiter with aerodynamic
performance characteristics comparable to our baseline
NASA direction also modified several of the system requirements and 15 x60 payload bay orbiter
1 CUMCo.AN
Main Engine-Orbiter
SSME
Payload Bay 15 x 60 14 x 45
Series Par Par SeriesLaunch Config Burn Burn Burn Burn
Booster Type
BRB SRM BRB SRM SRM BRB SRM BRB
Fed zBooster
Engine
Figure 1 Program Options
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- We then developed parallel burn/SRM (solid rocket motor) STUDY KEY ISSUES
stacks using the above core orbiter and 156" and 120" motors
and . What Are Technical & Cost Differences Between Series/BRB 
& Parallel SRM?
- How Much Weight & Cost Reduction for Smaller-Payload-Bay-Size Orbiter?
- Then compared both the orbiter as well as the full-up stacks to
a What Is Booster Design & Cost Status?
their baseline counterparts in weight and cost e What is Orbiter Design Status?
* How Can We Achieve Pad Abort Capability?
* What Are Implications of National Environmental Policy Act On Shuttle?
WAS IS NOW
MkI Mk II Figure 3 Study Key Issues
Orbiter Payload 15 x 60 15x 60 15x 60 14x 45
Payload Up-East/Polar/55 0  ?/25/? 65/40/? 65K/40K/25K 45K/?/25K In summary, these were the conclusions of our studies during this
Payload Down 25K 40K 40K 25K final contract period:
VStage, fps 6000 + 1000 6000 + 1000 >4000 >4000
Main Engine Type/T5 a, J-2S/65K SSME/TBD SSME/472K SSME/472KTSMain  J-2S/265  SSME/TBD SSME/472K SSME/472K I RSI R I * The comparison of a series/BRB (Ballistic Recoverable Booster) to
TPS Ablative RSI . RSI RSI
Avionics Low Cost Upgraded Low Cost/ Low Cost/ a parallel/SRM system, using the same orbiter in each case, reaf-
Evolutionary Evolutionary firmed what we had learned during previous study phases - namely,
OMS/RCS Storable Storable Storable Storable that solid propellant boosters significantly lower DDT&E costs,OMS AV, fps 650/1000 650/1000 650/1000/ 650/1000/
1400 1400 since they are more efficient than liquids and require less develop-
Cross Range, N Mi 1100 1100 1100 1100 ment, but increase cost per flight, since they are expendable. The
Abort Intact Intact Intact-All Intact-All
(Not Pad) (Not Pad) Phases Phases weight comparison is shown in Figure 4, the cost comparison in
Figure 5. Note that the SRM versions of the shuttle have about
Figure 2 System Characteristics half the weight of total inerts of BRB systems and nearly 2M lb
lower GLOW (gross liftoff weight). The corresponding DDT&E
Other major issues studied were the: cost decrease for SRM configurations is nearly one billion dollars,
but the "unamortized" cost per flight is about twice as high for
* Relative merits of pressure-fed versus pump-fed liquid propellant the expendable SRM's than liquid propellant 
recoverable boosters.
boosters As far as other technical issues affecting the selection of series/BRB
* Impact of providing pad abort capability and or parallel/SRM systems are concerned, we found that:
* Effect on the environment as a disciminator between the various
configurations studied 
- The HO tank is more efficient (has a lower structural fraction)
but generally heavier for a parallel configuration, thus contri-
The Study Key Issues are summarized in Figure 3. buting to the higher cost/flight
6OINQ
- Although use of orbiter engines and aero surfaces permit ascent
1.16 control of the parallel stack, the control authority is so
-1. - - .i marginal that we decided to assume booster TVC in all sizing
and costing. Booster TVC can be eliminated by canting the
booster nozzle and providing fins on the tank
- The thermal and acoustic environment induced on the parallelM Lbs
0Ser P.57ar 120"Par 156" configuration is more severe than that for a series stack, impos-
0.50 GLOW M Lb 6.396 4.580 4.553 ing about 1500 lb orbiter and 1000 lb HO tank weight penalty
BLOW, M Lb 5.119 2.788 2.854 - The inflight abort capability of the series and parallel systems
OLOW, M Lb 1.277 1.792 1.699 are essentially equivalent if a high thrust (10,000 lb) OMS en-Inert, M Lb 1.158 0.499 0.568
VStage, fps 4879 5067 5892 gine is used
Payload - The parallel/SRM configuration is somewhat more sensitive to
0 Margin, Lb 7500 10,700 7500
ser. Par. Par. environmental issues because of the HCI generated duringPress 1207 156" booster burn.Fed SRM SFIM booster burn.
BRB
Figure 4 Launch Configurations Characteristic Comparison * On the issue of orbiter payload bay size and payload weight, we
found that:
4.72 14.6 - A 14x45 payload bay orbiter could not meet all performance
3.85 3.82 13.1 requirements without either changing engine thrust (from
3 x 472 K to 3 x 380 K) or increasing the payload bay by a
minimum of five feet beyond the specified 45 ft length
7.07 - The orbiter dry weight decreased by about 8000 to 16,000 lb
depending upon which of the above two options were exercised
Sor Par Par 
- The GLOW's of the small payload bay orbiter configurationsBRB 156" 1207
Press. SRM SRM were about 2.5M lb lower and the total inerts about half thatFed Iof the baseline series/BRB stack. DDT&E was approximatelySer Par Par
BRB 156" 1207 one billion dollars lower and cost per flight approximately
PAF, $8 1.12 .90 .88 Press. SRM SRM
Fed double that of the baseline system
Total 10.46 
- Relative to a parallel/SRM stack using the 15x60 payload bay
orbiter, the overall DDT&E reduction of the small orbiter con-
figuration was about $43M, 70% of which was attributable to
Figure 5 15 x 60 Orbiter Series BRB vs Parallel SRM payload weight, rather than payload bay size, reduction
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A summary configuration comparison chart is presented in Figure 6. P SRM Pr SRMSer/BR 16 5x60 14 x 45
A checkmark designates the configuration which performs best relative to 15 x 60 Orbit hrb. Orb.
the evaluation parameter to which it applies. Press. Fed Pump Fed 156" 1205
* A comparative evaluation of pressure-fed versus pump-fed boosters
led to the conclusion that the pump-fed booster would present a
lower development risk, and would cost less to develop (by about
$500M) than the pressure-fed
* We studied the feasibility of providing pad abort capability and the Lowest Total Program Cost, .35 . 10.46 10.39
performance and cost impact of implementing it. We concluded $B F
that: Lowest DDT&E, $8 4.72 4.23 3.85 3.79
- Successful pad abort from the worst case situation (tank or Lowest Cost/Flight, SM 7.07 6.62 13.1 13.1
booster explosion) requires 5 to 7 sec warning time, depending r
Least Complex Design
upon the axial loading and blastwave overpressure we can Lemt Complex esgn
tolerate 
9 Least Acoustic Impact
- A swing engine orbiter configuration (the orbiter engines lo- * Easiest Ascent Control
cated on the HO tank during thrusting and then transferred to
the orbiter) offers significant advantages for pad abort Least Environmental Impact
- About $250M DDT&E and about $300K per flight would be
the cost of providing pad abort capability Figure 6 Configuration Comparison Summary
Our overall conclusions developed during this final study period can
be summarized as follows: Recommendation
* On the subject of solid versus liquid propellant boosters Since cost per flight, in our view, is vital to the future of the
shuttle program, we recommend the recoverable liquid booster
- SRM's have lower DDT&E but significantly higher cost per in a series configuration for shuttle development. Of the liquid
flight than liquid boosters boosters, we prefer the pump-fed system because of its better
- All SRM applications make the program potentially more performance, lower risk and lower cost.
sensitive to environmental issues (primarily because of HCl
pollution). * On the subject of payload bay size on the orbiter:
GNU-MAN
- The cost benefit of the smaller orbiter derives primarily from * On the subject of pad abort:
payload weight rather than payload bay size reduction
- Small payload bays make orbiter balance difficult. Bay must - The capability can be achieved but, as on previous programs,
will compound the design effortbe lengthened or engine thrust reduced
- Increases development and per flight costs
Recommendation
Recommendation
Let's make sure we understand all implications before we proceed
If we must minimize DDT&E, reduce payload weight requirement to implement. Swing engine arrangement should be seriously con-
first, but hold on to the 60 ft bay. sidered if pad abort is a requirement.
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STUDY OBJECTIVES
During the first half of this second four-month study extension, we 0 Parallel burn technical issues (control, inflight abort, induced en-
concentrated on the generic technical and cost issues of series vs parallel vironment)
burn shuttle systems, with primary emphasis on configurations employing * Capability for pad abort
ballistic recoverable liquid propellant boosters. Solid rocket motors were * Solid booster technical problems
treated as backup to the liquids and were sized to operate with the same * Liquid booster recovery technology
orbiter/HO tank combinations that resulted from optimization with BRB's. * Program costs
Our conclusions at the mid-point of the present study period were that:
* The series/BRB system was technically simpler than a parallel sys- Study effort was also to be devoted to a number of other configura-
tem but that: tions (see Figure 1 for the complete matrix of study configurations), but,
* The parallel/BRB configuration provided a backoff potential to in general, at a somewhat lower level of emphasis than the "baseline" series/
solid propellant boosters at lower cost per flight BRB and the parallel/SRM systems.
For the second half of the study, the objectives were somewhat Our analysis of NASA's objectives and concerns resulted in the formu-
different. Primary emphasis was still to be placed on the series/BRB system, lation of the set of "key issues" of Figure 3, and of a subset of technical and
but NASA now desired to consider the SRM's as candidate shuttle boosters programmatic questions for each key issue, the answers to which would pro-
in their own right rather than as a backup to liquids. Major interest centered vide the data for arriving at a conclusion and recommendation of the parti-
on the use of solids in conjunction with paralleliburn stacks. It was also cular "key issue".
required that the effect of orbiter payload bay size and payload weight
reduction on such a parallel/SRM configuration be evaluated. In the sections to follow, we will treat each key issue in terms of the
sub-issues or questions relevant to it, present our conclusions for each sub-
Major study emphasis was to be placed on the following areas of tech- issue and then summarize these as the basis for our overall conclusion and
nical and programmatic concern: recommendation on the "key issue".
7GRUMMAN
SERIES/BRB VERSUS PARALLEL/SRM
WHAT ARE THE PHYSICAL CONFIGURATION CHARA CTERISTICS? Series Burn/BRB
I M1 5 -- -*- Parallel Burn/156" SRM
In selecting the specific design points for all configurations studied, M Lb
we used the approach of choosing that booster staging velocity which yield-
ed 5% potential margin on orbiter inert weight. We define potential margin 1.5
(or payload margin) as that amount of inert weight increase in the orbiter M Lb 1.01
(or payload) which can be accommodated by simply expanding the HO tank 0.5 ----
while leaving all other elements of the system unchanged. This margin is
over and above the 10%-2%-10% growth allowance built into the orbiter/ lo
tank/booster design. pO 0 K Lb 5.
4 5 6
The design point selection based on potential margin is only applicable Staging Velocity, K fps
if the booster can be "rubberized", i.e., sized for any given orbiter/tank
weight. In the case of 120" solids, the maximum total impulse is a fixed Figure 7 15 x 60 Orbiter Launch 
Configuration Performance
quantity and we are forced to accept whatever tank size falls out when we M Lbs Design Point
tailor the SRM thrust profile to meet max q and max g constraints. When
we cite a potential payload margin for a 120" SRM configuration, it must be
realized that the accommodation of such an increase in inert weight involves
not only resizing the tank but also retailoring the SRM thrust profile. $8
9.5
Figure 7 shows the result of applying the 5% potential payload margin =20M
concept to the selection of the design point for both the baseline series/BRB 9 1,
as well as the parallel/156" SRM configurations. The payload margin is zero so
at or near the GLOW bucket and increases as we move towards the higher 4.= s
staging velocities. At the 7.5K lb margin point (5% of the approximately [
150K orbiter inert weight), we pay about 300K lb and 200K lb GLOW 4.7 -
penalty for the series/BRB and parallel/SRM cases, respectively. Figure 8 4 5 6
shows the cost penalty for this departure from the optimum weight design VStage, K fps
point (about $8M DDT&E) and indicates that this is a relatively low cost Figure 8 Cost of Payload Margin - Series BRB
PREUEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED 9
method of providing insurance against unexpected weight growth. The
delta's shown represent, however, only the costs associated with the initial PAYLOAD BAY SIZE 15x 60
sizing for a non-optimum staging velocity, and do not reflect the additional GLOW, M Lb 6.396
costs resulting from redesigning the tank if the potential weight increase BLOW, M Lb 5.118
HO Tank Liftoff Weight, M Lb 1.034
Orbiter Injected Weight, K Lb 244
Total Inert Weight, M Lb 1.158
We have made an extensive study of the cost implications of provid- VStage, fps 4879
ing an inherent allowance for growth versus margin for a potential growth
which may or may not relalize, but a discussion of these results is not possi- 76'
ble within the limitations of this summary. Our general conclusion is that a
judicious mix of growth allowance and margin is the best method of achiev- 275" Die 396" Di
3x472K
ing payload assurance, and that the extent of total contingency provided and SSME
the percentages thereof to be allocated to allowance and margin are a func- -86.7'
tion of the weight confidence level which we wish to impose. 1 2 ,
267.1' 7x 1136 K
The launch configurations corresponding to the design points selected
from the trending data are shown in Figures 9, 10 and 11. A comparison of Figure 9 Launch Configuration - Series BRB
their major characteristics is presented in Figure 12. Typically, the greater
structural efficiency of the solid propellant boosters results in the parallel/
SRM configuration exhibiting a decrease in GLOW of about 2.0M lb relative PAYLOAD BAY S
to the series/BRB case. Of greater interest, as being a stronger cost driver, GLOW, M Lb 4.553
is the fact that the total inert weight of the former is less than half that of BLOW, M Lb 2.854
the baseline. The more efficient SRM also tends to drive the staging velocity HO Tank Liftoff Weight, M Lb 1.453
Orbiter Injected Weight, K Lb 246
of the parallel/156" SRM stack to near 6000 fps, which is typically about Total Inert Weight, K Lb 568
1000 ft higher than that of the series system. This does tend to penalize the 7' Vstagep 5895
parallel configuration in cost per flight, since generally the minimum in the
launch cost trends occur between-4000 fps and 4500 fps staging velocity. 156" Dia SRM (2)
Orbiter 3 x 472K
WHAT IS THE DIFFEREVCE BETWEEN SERIES AND PARALLEL HO Orbiter ME
TANKS? 69.8'
162'-One of the major reasons for the GLOW difference between parallel 2 170.3 x 2313 K
and series configurations is the greater structural efficiency of the parallel
HO tank. This efficiency is most readily quantified in terms of pounds of Figure 10 Launch Configuration - Parallel 156" SRM
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dry tank weight per pound of loaded propellant. We designate this ratio the
PAYLOAD BAY SIZE. 15x 60 "structural fraction" (SF) of the tank, with a lower SF indicating a more
GLOW, M Lb 4.580 efficient structure. As shown in Figure 13 the parallel tanks generally ex-
BLOW, M Lb 2.788 hibit a lower SF (or higher propellant fraction (PF) which is the number of
HO Tank Liftoff Weight, M Lb 1.546 pounds of propellant per pound of total loaded tank weight) than series
Orbiter Injected Weight, K Lb 246
329" Dia Total Inert Weight, K Lb 598 tanks. The reason for the higher efficiency of the parallel tanks becomes
Vstage, fps 5067 apparent if the tank design criteria and loading conditions for the series
S 73.5 and parallel stack are compared. In order to clearly demonstrate the weight
1207 SRM (4) differences resulting from these loading conditions, we have taken a series
tank at the design point propellant loading of one of our study configura-
3 x 472 K tions (14x45 payload bay orbiter/BRB) and compared its weight to a parallel
SSME 3.1' tank designed for the same amount of propellant.
The design criteria for the two tanks are shown in Figure 14. Compa-
7.8' 4 x 895 K S.L. Thrust rable elements of these tanks are, of course, designed by the same loading
conditions, but the actual loads are quite different in the two cases. Fig-
Figure 11 Launch Configuration - Parallel 1207 ure 15 shows the results of an analysis of applied axial loads and bending
1.16F
10rSeries S.F. Weight
1.0 .05 Loaded Propellant Wt.
045 Parallel
M Lbs 1.0 2.0
0.57 x 60 - Loaded Propellant, M Lb
Ser BRB Par 120" Par 156"
0.50 GLOW, M Lb 6.396 4.580 4.553
BLOW, M Lb 5.119 2.788 2.854 Propellant Nominal Propellant
OLOW, M Lb 1.277 1.792 1.699 Fraction P - Nom. Prop + Tank Inert Wt.
Inert, M Lb 1.158 0.499 0.568
VStage
, 
'ps 4879 5067 5892 .945
Payload .940 Series
0L_ Margin, Lb 7500 10,700 7500 Booster
Ser. Par. Par. Thrust 1.0 2.0
Press 1207 156" Nominal Propellant, M Lb
Fed SRM SRM
BRB
Figure 12 Launch Configurations Characteristic Comparison Figure 13 HO Tank Mass Fractions
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LO.2 Tank Sys Press. 4 Parallel
MidAxial Skirt
Mid Skirt Fwd Dome Sys Press. at 2000F Load Lb
I Wall Thick. . Sys Press.
LH2  Cyl + Head LH2  100M 1Sect. In.-Lb
Sect Stiffeners * Banding & In.-Lb SeriesAxial Loads
Aft Dome Sys Press. + Head 3 i|i
Aft Skirt & Axial
Loads
Figure 14 HO Tank Structural Design Criteria Figure 15 HO Tank Design Limit Loads Envelope
moments for the case of a series and parallel tank. These loads partially Figure 16 summarizes the design conditions for the two tanks and
design the cylindrical sections and aft domes of the LH2 tank (see Fig- Figure 17 shows the weight differential resulting therefrom. The LO2 and
ure 13).
The series tank experiences significantly higher axial loads over most
of the length of LH2 tank and higher bending moments at the aft section of Design Condition
that tank than does the parallel one. The higher axial loads result from the Tank Series ParallelComponent Designed By
difference in the manner in which booster thrust loads (indicated by the LO2 Tank Sys Press. 500OF at 24 psi 500OF at 24 psi
arrows in Figure 15) are applied to the HO tank. In the series stack, booster + Head 3.25g Axial Load 1.25g at Liftoff
Full Tank 3.2g at 70% Full Tank
thrust is transmitted to the tank via the aft tank skirt, thus applying axial nd Skirt Axial Load, 3.2g Axial Load 3.2g + Axial Load
compression loads over the entire length of LH2 tank and over part of the Primarily
LO2 tank up to the forward tank frame where the major load carrying LH2 Tank Sys Press.
Wall Fwd Sect 200oF at 36 psi 2000 F at 36 psi
orbiter attachment structure is located. By contrast, the parallel booster Wall Mid Sect 3.25g at Bstr BO 1.25g at Liftoff
Wall Aft Sect + Head 3.25g at Bstr 80 3.0g + at Bstr BOthrust loads are carried into the tank at the forward intertank area, so that LH2 Tank Bending & Full-Length Two-Point Support:
the only axial loads seen by the parallel LH2 tank are the orbiter thrust Stifeners Axial Loads Cantilever, Bstr 80:BO
Nz = 0.05 + 0.1 N = -0.f4 Meloads transmitted by the aft orbiter/tank attachment structure. Bending NY =  0.1 Nx = 3.0+ Acc l
moments experienced by the series tank are higher in the aft section, since Nx = 3.25 Nz = -0.27, )After
it is a cantilevered, end supported structure, while the parallel tank is forward
and aft supported via the attachment structure to the booster. Figure 16 HO Tank Structural Design Conditions
12
BASED ON PROPELLANT WEIGHT OF 925,450 Lb (Nominal) and thus becomes heavier than for a comparable series configuration - but,
although heavier, it is more efficient.
Series Parallel Afrom Series
LO2 Tank 9274 7336 -1938 WHAT IS THE SSME EPL FOR NO ABORT GAP?
Mid Skirt 4807 3641 -1166
LH2 Tank 22,320 20,718 -1602 In this section we will consider the abort capability of the parallel
Miscellaneous 620 820 +200 series configurations relative to all in flight abort regimes. We will, at this
Aft Skirt (Series) 1218 -1218 point, exclude pad abort capability considerations, since those are treated in
Booster Attach (Par) 314 +314 some detail in a later section. The abort regimes discussed herein are illus-
Nose Cone 732 732 - trated in Figure 18. Of major concern is the ability of the configuration to
TPS/lnsulation 3997 4937 +940 avoid having to use an alternate site when aborting during ascent flight. This
Systems 7200 6645 -555 alternate landing site requirement arises from the inability to either abort
Dry Weight 50,168 45,143 -5025 back to the launch site or abort to orbit as a result of a failure, primarily
Dry Weight .05351 .04842 that of an orbiter engine, occurring during the ascent thrust phase. The
Loaded Propellant I time period during ascent flight in which a failure of the orbiter engine
Figure 17 Parallel - Series Comparison
netion
part of the LH2 tank weight decrease of the parallel tank comes from the
lower pressure head seen by these tanks at the high g levels (near booster
burnout) and the decrease in tank wall thickness that it allows. The
reason for the pressure head being lower is that, in a parallel burn con-
figuration, the HO tank is being depleted during booster burn so that, at
staging, the tanks are only about 70% full and the static pressure head due
to liquid column height is commensurately lower.
Comparing the actual tanks for the configurations of specific interest
in this section, we find that the series/BRB tank dry weight is 52K lb and
that of the parallel/SRM (120") tank is 66K lb. However, although the hd
Abort
parallel tank is significantly heavier, its SF is 0.0445 as compared to 0.0525
for the series tank. This is typically the case whenever we compare parallel . h S Sie
to series configurations. Since the parallel burn orbiter engines fire during
the entire ascent-to-orbit flight, the HO tank must carry more propellant Figure 18 Abort Regimes
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requires landing at a site other than the original launch site is designated as
the "abort gap". It is important to minimize or eliminate this abort gap S eries onfiguration Pralll Configuration
100
since alternate landing sites are either not available or, if there are possibil-
ities for landing at such alternate sites, the problem of ferrying the orbiter Abort - EPL M7000 t,
back to the launch site may become exceedingly complex. G o EPL
EPL
Since the failure of an orbiter engine can be partially compensated - oos ub T OMS Thrust
for by increasing the thrust level of the remaining orbiter engines, (going, 3% EPL 7000 Lb
20 0%in other words, to the so-called "emergency power level" (EPL)), the extent EPL
to which such EPL capability is available on the SSME's, or the extent to - - --- 0 7000 Lb Thr
which it is required to eliminate the abort gap is of considerable interest. 20- 3 30 L9 3
Abort Mode 5 Tn [  9700 LbOur studies have shown that it is possible to close this abort gap for e SMoe 97009700 L
both configurations and all missons by applying various techniques such as 9700 Lb 9 South Polar
increasing the flight performance reserves (FPR), or increasing the thrust 60 .7 L South Polar Due East
level of the OMS engines. This latter approach has the dual benefit of in-
DueEast •Two OMS Engines
creasing the rate at which OMS propellants are being depleted, as well as oo TOMS Thrust Is per Engine
increasing the thust level itself, both of which increase orbiter thrust to * EPL is Main Engine EPL
weight and improve abort performance. As shown in Figure 19, a zero
abort gap at zero or very small main engine EPL can be achieved for both Figure 19 Abort Gap
configurations on both due-east and south-polar missions by the use of the
9700 lb thrust LM descent engine for OMS. ORBITER - ACOUSTIC WEIGHT PENALTY OF
PARALLEL BURN
PAR BURN WEIGHT A14
DO LA UNCH ACOUSTICS AND INTERFERENCE HEA TING PENALIZE 150 PENALTY + 1449 Lb 153
148.5PARALLEL SRM? P - 1.a4
14 160 Payload Bay
SDr-Havir 1o 166
Some of the features characteristic to a parallel burn configuration -- 15 Fuselage Side 162 157.5
namely, the simultaneous firing at all engines at liftoff and the close con- 650._ Heavier Skin -323 Lb 160
junction of these engines to the base of the HO tank - tend to induce 151.s n _- Fin - Heavier I 13
thermal and acoustic environments on that configuration which are more 152 Skin -93 Lb 171.5
severe than what would be experienced on a series burn stack. This is
* Tank Wall Thicknessillustrated on Figure 20, in which the launch acoustic levels at liftoff for Not Designed by Acoustics
both configurations are indicated by the straight dash lines. Note that, in Note: Contours Are Transonic Acoustic
general, the parallel burn configuration experiences eight to nine db higher Levels, AllOthers Are Lift-Off
liftoff acoustic levels at the aft end of the configuration than does the series Figure 20 Orbiter - Acoustic Weight Penalty of Parallel Burn
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stack. This results from the simultaneous firing of booster and orbiter en-
gines and from the amplification of the ground reflection wave of the pad at or 120" Dia
near liftoff. During transonic flight, there are localized areas on both config- -.5 Lb/Ft2
urations which experience higher vibration or acoustic levels than would - --
normally be expected. These are indicated by the closed contours shown on -
Figure 20. The weight penalties imposed on the parallel burn configuration 2.0 -
by these higher acoustic levels are shown on the figure. The total weight I .2.3
penalty is approximately 1500 lb which goes toward increasing the gage of
the payload bay door skins, fuselage side skins, and part of the vertical fin. so-
There is no weight penalty attached to the tank structure per se for these 14 _
higher acoustic levels since the tank wall thickness is designed by pressure A .9
considerations and is adequate to withstand the predicted acoustic levels. o 30 .5
Additional weight penalties may result for the parallel system as a result of 20
the increased vibration environment seen by the orbiter equipments, par- a
I 1 AWeight= 940 Lb
ticularly those in the aft sections. This will require the imposition of higher 10-
vibration qualification levels or a stronger structural design for these equip- 0 1
a 1.0
ments at a cost and weight penalty that it is not possible to assess at this point. S/R
The other area of more severe induced environment on a parallel burn Figure 21 Tank Base Heating Penalty from Plume Radiation
configuration is caused by booster plume impingement. Radiation from the
metallic particles contained in the SRM exhaust plume impose a high heat CAN TVC AND THRUST TERMINA TION BE ELIMINA TED ON THE
flux on the bottom of the HO tank and requires additional thermal protec- PARALLEL SRM?
tion to keep the tank temperature within design limits. Figure 21 shows
the effect of this plume radiation on the HO tank base in terms of TPS One of the original attractions of a parallel burn configuration was the
penalty. The heat flux shown on the figure is essentially the additional possibility that booster thrust vector control might not be required and
flux generated by the SRM plume and the additional ablative protection, that thus the cost and weight of the booster could be significantly reduced.
shown on the right hand side of the figure, results in a total weight penalty During the first half of the second extension study period, considerable
on the order of 1000 lb. We have also examined other potential sources of preliminary control studies were performed to determine whether such an
thermal environment penalties on the parallel configurations, such as inter- approach was feasible. Our conclusions at the mid-term briefing were that
ference heating between the tank and booster and plume induced recircula- there was sufficient uncertainty about the ability to control the configuration
tion heating near the aft section of the orbiter. We have found however, that with orbiter engines and orbiter control surfaces alone to warrant the
neither of those phenomena have a severe enough effect'to cause any addi- recommendation that booster thrust vector control be included in all further
tional weight penalty on the orbiter, tank or booster. studies of booster size and cost.
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During the final half of the study period, we continued and extended
these control studies by using a 6-degree-of-freedom digital simulation to e No BoosterTVC
* *0 Booster Thrust
explore all possible avenues of approach to the control of the combined Misalignment
configuration. Our studies included examination of control authority re- Available * Booster EnginesCanted Through CG
quirements due to orbiter/booster roll-yaw coupling and due to aero dis- e Rudder + Eleven
turbances generated by worst case wind shear conditions at various altitudes Torque Required 20 um25 Efects4 Plume Effects
in the trajectory. We then studied several possible methods of providing the 2 Neglected
control authority required. We looked at the possibility of using orbiter 1916.5 16.6 15.9
-8 14.4
engines alone, then at coupling the engine control capability with those of
the orbiter aero surfaces and finally at the combination of orbiter and Aero
Disturbance 11
booster engine control capability to provide control authority. 8
u 8
The results of these studies are summarized in Figures 22, 23 and 24. Bending/Slosh . a m 1.4
The figures show, in each case, the required control torque for each con- Mialignment -3 Eng 2Eng
figuration axis and the amount of control authority available under condi- Pitch Yew Roll
tions of all orbiter engines firing and of one orbiter engine out. Figure 22 Torque in Ft - Lb x 106 Coupled
shows clearly that the torque available from orbiter engines alone, even when
Figure 23 Aero Disturbance - Aero Surface Control - 156's
Torque * BoosterTVC±12 °
N No Booster TVC 66 1be/40 Booster Misalignment0 oo V 3% Thrust Unbalance
Torque Required * %o Booster Thrust * 6
0 Cant
20 Torque Misalignment Booster
18 Available * Booster Engines
16 Canted Through CG Torque Reqd
14.4 1 16 16.5
Aero I 13
Disturbance 8 Aero Disturbance 10
u 5.5 Orbiter 7Bending/Slosh &Booster Misalignment 3 Eng 2 Eng 3 Eng 2 EngBending/Slosh 1.4 Booster Thrust Unbal& Booster .... mn Pitch Yaw Roll
Misalignmen t  . /
3 Eng 2 Eng CoupledPitch Yaw Roll
Torque in Ft - Lb x 1116 Coupled
Figure 22 Aero Disturbance - Control Requirements - 156's Figure 24 Aero Disturbance - SRM TVC Control
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all engines are firing, is insufficient to provide the requisite control authority. abort contingency arising during the early phase of the ascent boost flight,
The combination of orbiter engines and orbiter aero surface control comes the orbiter must be capable of separating from the booster, which can only
close to meeting control requirements as shown in Figure 23. For the case be accomplished if booster thrust is neutralized. Thus, the requirement for
of one orbiter engine out, however, this situation becomes sufficiently thrust termination of the SRM cannot be waived unless the probability of
marginal in the pitch and yaw axes to still retain the mid-term conclusion early mission abort is considered to be too small to design for.
that booster TVC is required. Note also that the data shown for aero sur-
face control capability is based on ±200 deflection angle and 25 degree per HOW DO THESE CONFIGURA TIONS COMPARE ON COSTS?
second rate capability for both rudder and elevons which exceeds the normal
design requirements for reentry and supersonic aerodynamic control. Thus, The comparative DDT&E cost, cost per flight, and peak annual fund-
a design and weight penalty must be paid even for the somewhat marginal ing data for the three configurations considered in this section are presented
control capability provided. in Figure 25. Note that, typically, the development cost of the parallel/SRM
configurations is about $900M less than that of a series burn/BRB system,
but that the cost per flight of the expendable SRM configuration is nearly
A better control margin can be provided by the use of fins on the double that of the recoverable liquid propellant booster system. Peak
underside of the tank. Approximately 410 sq ft of fin area is required to
annual funding for the liquid propellant booster system is on the order of
provide a 20% excess of control torque available over that required. The use $100M to $200M higher than that of th SRM configurations, but total
of such a fin would impose weight penalty of approximately 2500 lb on the program cost is higher for the solids since, for a 455 flight standard traffic
tanks. Additional f surface could be added to reduce the aero surface model, 900 solid boosters must be manufactured as opposed to only 12 of
deflection requirements closer to present design capability. This, however, the liquid propellant recoverable boosters for the series burn system.
would increase the weight penalty on the tanks. If booster thrust vector
control capability is provided, the combination of booster and orbiter
engine control authority is sufficient to provide the control torque require- 4.72 14.6
ments, Figure 24. Booster thrust vector control capability with an approx- 385 3.82
imately ±120 gimballing range would eliminate the necessity for the use of
orbiter aero surfaces.
7.07
In summary then, the question of "can booster TVC be eliminated?"
can be answered as follows: "Yes it can, by the proper combination of R 156" 1207
orbiter engine gimballing, use of orbiter elevon and rudder deflection capa- Press. SRM SM
bility and by providing a relatively large fixed fin under the tank." How- Sei Par Par
ever, all our weight and cost numbers are based on the assumption of PAF, $B 1.12 .90 .88 BRB 156" 1207
TVC in the booster. Fed
Total
Prog SB 9.35 10.46 11.06
The question of whether SRM thrust termination can be eliminated
however, must be answered in the negative. For the situation of a mission Figure 25 Series BRB vs Parallel SRM 15 x 60 Orbiter
17
TO SUM UP 0 Inflight Abort
- High thrust OMS can close abort gap for all missions and con-
The results of the studies pertinent to the question of series BRB figurations at zero or very low SSME EPL
versus parallel SRM configurations are summarized as follows: * Induced Environment - For parallel burn:
Added - 1450 lb to orbiter for acoustics
* Cost and Weight - Series BRB higher DDT&E by $870M but lower - 940 lb of TPS on HO tanks
cost per flight by $6M - 7 db higher acoustic level at cargo bay
- Higher equipment vibration levels
* Ascent Control -- Booster TVC requirement assumed weight and * HO Tank- Parallel tank more efficient - .005 to .008 difference
cost. Can be eliminated by use of fins and engine canting. in structural fraction
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ORBITER DESIGN
HOW HAS THE 15x60 BAY ORBITER CHANGED SINCE DECEMBER on the study by NASA. Figure 27 summarizes the changes from
1971? the December 1971 mid-term report. Up to that point, all orbiter
design and performance requirements had been based on the
The recent orbiter weight history is depicted graphically on Figure Mark I version of the system and these are shown on the first column on
26. Of particular interest is the weight growth shown from the 161,000 Figure 27. Instead of four J-2S engines previously required for the
lb landed weight of the December 1971 version to the 190,000 lb target Mark I orbiter, three 472K SSME's were now specified. Instead of
weight presently used in our weight reporting. This weight increase has the 25K lb up payload for the south-polar mission, 40K lb up-payload was
resulted primarily from the changing requirements and groundrules imposed now specified and similarly the requirement for down payload went from
25,000 to 40,000 lb. This increased the orbiter landed weight to 184,000 lb.
The most significant performance requirement change was the reduction
Sept 71 - - - - - - - - - - - Landed Weight of 1 Sept HO in design speed from 156 to 150 knots. It was this particular performance
L andd P -l 40K to 45K) specification which had the greatest impact on the orbiter configuration
Subsyst- Nw Dmel to Off-Shelf
esaty for Alum Ablative and weight. Considerable aerodynamic studies were performed to examine
Larger Cabin of Crew
- - First Estimate of H044A
Target Weight Reduction
Nov71 -- -- ------ Lnded Weight with Ablative
SLeou Ablated TPS
H044A Design Limit Land Weight
Dec 71- -- --- - -- - - -- - - - 040A Design Baelined
Landed P1 A (25K to 40K) Sept 71 - Dec 71 - 040A - Feb 72 - 15 x 60 Orb
Docking Ring Not in P.L. Mk I  Mk II
-4 J-2 vs 3-472K SSME ng Main Engines 4x J-2S 4 x 265K 3
184K OrbiterWt - - - - - Non-Ablative TPS Payload Up - Polar < 25K 40K 40K
for Trending Study
25 Jan 72 - - - - - - - - Iteration for Higher Land Weight Payload Down 25K 40K 40K
Input for Sizing & Trnding VDesign 156 Kts 150 Kt
-- - - Wing to 50 Subsonic Long. Stability ---- 2% Des into 150 V ign C.G. Range 
~ 2%
-- Finto CN.0015
Hypersonic ct Range 200 50
for Orbiter Desig - - - - - Subsyst Changes External Shape Communal 040A Bigger Wing Less Sweep
- -- Iteration Effect I Bigger Fin & Rudder
Feb72- TPS Ablative I RSI & Carbon/ RSI & Carbon/Carbon
I Carbon
150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 * Orbiter Getting Heavier
Orbiter Landed Weight, K Lb
Figure 26 15 x 60 Orbiter Landed Weight History Figure 27 Changing Requirements and Ground Rules Orbiter Status
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all the configuration options in terms of wing area, wing cross section, wing
sweep angle, fin area, etc., which would allow us to meet the design speed
condition at a minimum weight penalty. The lowest weight solution, which Dry Weight, K Lb = 145 K
still, however, imposed about 6,000 lb orbiter landed weight penalty, involved Landed Weight, K Lb = 190
a change in the wing reference area from 3150 to 3440 sq ft, a change in the 92'6"
landing edge wing sweep from 600 to 490 and in trailing edge sweep from 0
to -50, a change in the wing cross section from symmetrical to twisted Wing - sref 3440 Ft2
cambered and a change in the tail area from 354 to 550 sq ft. The orbiter L. E. Sweep 490 T. E. - 50
evolution is summarized on Figure 28 which compares the February 1972 ACS Thrusters (32) 850 Lb 3 x 472 K
orbiter characteristics to those presented at the December 1971 mid-term
briefing. Figure 29 shows the 15x60 payload bay orbiter configuration Vert. Tail 550 Ft2
which corresponds to the present target weight of 190,000 lb. This con- Nose Docking 49'-4"
figuration incorporates such recent baseline changes as nose docking rather ~ . '
than hood docking and the change from LM ascent engines to LM descent
engines in the OMS. All sizing and trending data, however, is based on the LM Descent (2) 10K Lb
184,000 lb landed weight orbiter which was the version in existence at the
time when we had to finalize our input to the trending programs. Figure 29 15 x 60 Orbiter
IS THE 14x45 PA YLOAD BA Y ORBITER FEASIBLE?
The major problem encountered in arriving at an aerodynamically
I S C E Dec.71 Feb. 72 acceptable configuration for a 14x45 payload bay orbiter was the fact that
the fuselage was reduced in length and diameter but the engine weight remain-
L Mk I Mk II ed the same, thus causing the cg to shift too far aft for acceptable aero-
000 490 Engines 4 x J2S 4 x 265K 3 x 472K dynamic performance. Two options were open to us to achieve the desired
Dry Wt Lb 136K 133K 145K
P.L. Down,Wt Lb 25K 40K 40K performance as shown in Figure 30. In one option, the payload bay was ex-
Landed Wt, Lb 161K 178K 190K
Vone, Kt 167 175 1S0 tended from 45 to 50 ft in length and in the other option the total thrust of
73' C.G. Landed 65-67% 6567% 66.1-68.1% the engine system was reduced from the 1.4M lb of the three 472K engines
SRef, Ft
2  3155 3155 3440
L.E. Sweep 600 600 490 to 1.14M lb corresponding to three 380K engines. In both cases, the RCS
T.E. Sweep 00 00 -50
Wing Section 8% Sym 8% Sym 9% Camb pod on the tail fin had to be moved to the forward section of the fuselage
Body Cline Soft Soft Soft and the APU's from the aft section to the mid-body in order to obtain ac-
4 , Co/ .0007 .0007 .001542.3' il Ar Ft2 354 354 550 ceptable cg locations. We developed an orbiter configuration meeting all
aerodynamic design requirements for each of these two approach options
and their characteristics are presented in Figure 31 where they are compared
Figure 28 Orbiter Evolution to each other as well as to the corresponding characteristics of the 15x60
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PROLEM a x 45 Orbiter SOLUTION 1 15X60 14 14X45Starting With a 14 x 45 Orbiter
With 1.416 M Lb Thrust (3 x 472K) * Extend P.L. to 50 Ft P.L. Bay Vol, Ft 3  10,600 ,660 6,927
* Maintain V = 150 Kt * RCSto Nose/Wing/Wing Press. Cabin Vol, Ft3  3.550 3,180 3,180
Maintain Long ability at+2% APU'sto Mid Body Dry Weight, Lb 145K 137K 129K12114'- Landed Weight, Lb 190K 161K 158K
P.L. Down Weight, Lb 40K 25K 25K
4 48.80 C.G. Aft, % B.L. 68.1 67 66.2%
490 Wings Ref Ft2 3,440 3,060 2,950
Vert Tail, Ft2  550 500 500
Total SWet Ft2  11,070 9,640 9,134
Approach Drag, Lb 32,000 27,000 26,300
T/W Staging 1.11 1.18 1.13
S Ves'Kt 150 150 150
873- Long Stab. Margin, 2 2 2
SOLUTION 2 Orbiter Engines 3 x 472 K 3 x 472 K 3x 380K
* Reduce Thrust to 1.14 M Lb (3 x 380K) Length, Ft 128.1 114.0 108.0
* RCS to Nose/Wing/Wing Span, Ft 92.5 87.2 84.5
. APU's to Mid Body .4.9' Height, Ft 49 3 46.8 46.1
Figure 30 14 x 45 Orbiter Aero Options Figure 31 Orbiter Comparison
payload bay orbiter. Note that the 14x45 orbiter version with the smaller seen later, it increases the overall configuration weight because of the lower
engine size results in lower dry weight for the orbiter itself, but, as will be thrust to weight resulting from the lower engine thrust.
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15x60/SERIES/BRB VERSUS 14x45/PARALLEL/SRM
WHA TARE THE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OFA 14x45/
PARALLEL/SRM CONFIG URA TION? PAY LOAD BAY SZE 14 x
Glow, M Lb 3.705
BLOW. M Lb 2.144
The launch configurations of 14x45 payload bay orbiter/SRM stacks LHN HO Tank Liftoff Weight, M Lb 1.350
using either four 1205's or two156" SRM's are shown in Figure 32 and L02  Orbiter Inecte Weight K Lb 211
..... Total Inert Weight, K Lb 476
33. A comparison of major configuration characteristics is presented in 78.5' Vtage
, 
fps 5,399
Figure 34 in which the baseline system characteristics are also included for 3 x 472K
reference. Again we see that the SRM configurations show a significant 156" Di0 SRM (2) ME
reduction in total inert as well as overall liftoff weight relative to the liquid 315" Dia
propellant baseline. It should be noted that the use of low thrust engines, - 7 .8'
which as shown in the previous section, resulted in the lower dry weight in the
orbiter, did however increase the stack weight by anywhere from 200K to 140.2' 2x 1770K
150'-
Figure 33 Launch Configuration - Parallel 156" SRM
PAYLOAD BAY SIZE 14 x 45LH2
LO2  GLOW, M Lb 3.738
BLOW, M Lb 2.032
HO Tank Liftoff Weight, M Lb 1.495
78.5' Orbiter Injected Weight, K Lb 211
Total Inert Weight, K Lb 513 1.16
VStage fps 4045
1205 SRM (4) o TOTAL 1560 14.45 14x45
3 x 472K sIiE Sea r.1206 SRM
132' SSME RM SM
Totl I4.45. GLOW, ML 636 3.738 371105
1 3Irt BLOW, M Lb 5.119 2.032 2.144
M b 5 .46 LOW, M Lb 1.277 1.706 1.561
nrt, M Lb 1.158 .513 .476
"vstwl 
,  
4879 4045 5si
hrllin, Lb 7500 11000 6900
363" Dia s. .. hr.
4 x 895, K S.L. Thrust P,. t" 156"
126.5' Fed SRM SRM
Figure 32 Launch Configuration - Parallel 1205 Figure 34 Launch Configuration Characteristics Comparison
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400K lb because of the lower performance capability at the low engine approximately $40M saving in development cost, nearly $37M of which is
thrust. the result of development cost savings in the orbiter itself. We found that
70% of the saving in development cost accrued from the reduction in pay-
HO W DO PA YLOAD AND BA Y SIZE WEIGHT REDUCTIONS EFFECT load weight rather than in size of the payload bay.
COST?
The comparative costs of the small payload bay orbiter configurations
relative to the baseline serics/liquid propellant booster system are shown in 4.72
Figure 35. The general cost relationships shown on that figure follow the 13.79 3.7 14.3
same trends previously evidenced whenever a liquid propellant and solid 13.1
propellant booster configuration were compared. That is, the development cost 11.6 12.47
of the solid system is lower, but cost per flight and total program cost of the
solid system is considerably higher than that of the liquid propellant booster 7.07Ser Par. Par. Par Par
configuration. In comparing the configurations options for the small pay- BRB 156 1205 156 1207
Pro. SRM SRM SRM SRMload bay orbiters, it may be noted that the low thrust versions show some Fed t
reduction in development costs relative to the standard size engine version 15 x 0 14 x 4725 14 x 45803 x 472 3 x 380
but as might be expected, the cost per flight increases since the increase
in stack and in tank weight more than compensates for the lower refurbish- PAF $1 1.12 .88 .87 .87 .86 156 205 156 2r07
ment costs of the orbiter itself. Compared to the baseline, the 14x45/ TotaPress. SRM SRM SR SRI Fed
parallel/SRM system costs between $900M to $1B less to develop, but Prog. $S 9.35 9.75 10.39 10.06 10.85 15x60 14x45 14x45
3 x 472 3x 380$4.5M to $5.5M more per flight. Relative to the standard payload bay size
version of the parallel/SRM configuration, the small orbiter results in an Figure 35 Series BRB 15 x 60 vs Parallel SRM 14 x 45
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TO SUM UP 2.6M lb lower GLOW and 600K lb lower inerts than 15x6
orbiter/series/BRB
The conclusions of our study relative to the effect of reducing the - 14x45 payload bay orbiter lighter than 14x50 orbiter, but
payload bay size and payload weight of the orbiter are summarized as GLOW higher by 200K lb and total inerts higher by 30K lb
follows:
0 Cost
SDesign Evolution WARelative to baseline system:
aWAS IS - Small bay orbiter/parallel/SRM saves nearly $1B develop-
Payload Up/Down 25K lb 40K ment cost but
ment cost but
VDesign 167/175 Kt 150 Kt 
- Increases cost per flight by about $5M
Landed Weight 161/178K lb 190K lb Relative to 15x60 payload bay orbiter/parallel/SRM system:
LE Sweep 600 490 - Small payload bay orbiter saves $43M DDT&E ($37M in
orbiter) for 14x50 version and $92M DDT&E ($62M in
* Small Payload Bay orbiter) for 14x45 version
- Feasible - but 5 ft longer or use lower thrust engines - 70% of DDT&E saving is due to payload weight reduction
* Weight and Size - Cost per flight is $1.6M less for 14x50 orbiter, $0.5M less
- Small payload bay orbiter/parallel/SRM stack about 2.4 to for 14x45 orbiter
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BOOSTER DESIGN
SOLID PROPELLANTBOOSTERS 120 IN. DIA. SRM 156IN. DIA. SRM
PARALLEL SERIES BURN PARALLEL SERIES BURN
The solid propellant booster configurations considered in this study BURN TANDEM STRAP-ON BURN TANDEM STRAP-ON
period are shown on Figure 36.
Our study of solid propellant boosters concentrated on the resolution
of these key issues:
* The best method of providing booster thrust vector control capa-
bility
* Booster separation technique for a parallel burn system
* Choice between 120" and 156" diameter SRM'S -
* Choice between parallel and series configurations i
* Detailed evaluation of solid booster cost buildup from the motor
to the complete stage 979-165 9 7 -1
Figure 36 SRM Booster Configurations Candidates
On the subject of ascent control, we had concluded that booster
thrust vector control should be baselined for all configurations. We then For booster separation, we considered separation-rockets-only, mech-
performed a trade study to determine if liquid injection or mechanical noz- anical-linkage-only and combination separation-rocket-forward/links aft
zle gimballing should be employed as the SRM TVC method. We compared system, as shown on Figure 37. The all-rocket system provided weight
a gimballed nozzle with ±7.50 thrust vectoring capability to a liquid injection and cost advantages relative to the other approaches considered. (See
system capable of ±50 thrust deflection. Our study showed that the gim- Figure 37). In addition the lower development risk provided by previous
balled nozzle offered significant weight (by over 100K lb) and cost (by Titan experience and the negligible load interaction with the orbiter
about $8M DDT&E and $800K per flight) savings as well as providing warranted our baselining the rocket-only system as the booster separa-
greater flexibility in accommodating changes in vehicle design and flight tion approach.
conditions. Although the study was done specifically for a parallel system,
the general results are equally applicable to a series configuration. We We examined the factors relating to the choice of SRM diameter in
thus baselined the gimballed nozzle as the thrust vectoring mechanism for some detail. Again, our studies were specifically oriented towards a parallel
all solid boosters. configuration, but the conclusions would apply equally well to a series syste
'MCDING TGE B 275NO
Rockets (Fore and Aft) Rockets and Aft Hinge Parallel Linkage DISCRIMINATORS 120 INCH DIAMETER 156 INCH DIAMETER
EXPERIENCE TITAN III C 9TEST FIRINGS
5 PFRT THIOKOL AND
17 FLIGHTS LOCKHEED
Sj TITAN III M
1PFRT
TRANSPORT UNRESTRICTED RAIL RAIL O.K.
Discriminators Rockets (Fore and Aft) Rockets and Aft Hinge Parallel Linkage ROUTES RESTRICTED ROUTES
AWeight, Lb
Booster Baseline *8180 -4030 HANDLING EASIER
Orbiter Baseline 0 *5770
Payload Base - 600 .5000 CONFIGURATION COMPLEXITY GREATER
ASystem Cost -($1061
DDT&E - 4.2 + 0.6
*CostIFliigt - 0.26 0.12 RELIABILITY (BOOSTER) 0.98 0.99
Program -+ 119 + 40.0
Experience Titan III C None None MOTOR QUANTITY 1,780 890
Ptumst Ipintnt Onk0ites Worst Moderate None (PRODUCTION)
Reaction Forces on Orbiter Negligible Worst Moderate
*Does Not Include Transportation Cost BLOW 2,825 M LB. 2,767 M LB.
Figure 37 Separation Approach COST. BOOSTER (M)
DDT&E 340 369
PRODUCTION 3,949 3,419
OPERATIONS 488 394
The results of the trade study of 120" vs 156" SRM's (the only two diameters TOTAL 4,777 4.182
evaluated in detail) are presented in Figure 38. Clearly, the experience fac-
tor favors the SRM's since they have been used in operational Titan flights, Figure 38 What is Preferred SRM Diameter? (Parallel Burn)
whereas the 156" solids have only been test fired. This operational back-
ground reflects itself in a somewhat lower DDT&E cost, but the shuttle
application requires sufficient additional motor and stage development on
the 120" SRM's to make the development cost advantage relative to the Having explored the major technical and cost factors relating to SRM's,
156" SRM's insignificant (about $30M). On the other hand, because we compared series and parallel configurations employing these solids
the 120" SRM configurations require generally twice as many motors than (specifically 156" SRM's) as booster stages. The results of this comparative
do 156" systems, the cost/flight increases by about $1.5M for the case of evaluation are summarized in Figure 39. We prefer the parallel system
a parallel configuration,thus adding approximately $600M to the total pro- primarily because the lower GLOW and weight of total inerts of the parallel
gram cost at the standard traffic model. The significant decrease in cost/ configuration (by about 300K lb in GLOW, and 100K lb in total inerts) and
flight coupled with the greater reliability because of the fewer components the reduction in number of SRM's required (from three for series to two for
and lower stage complexity makes 156" the preferred solid booster parallel) results in a $2M saving in cost per flight without penalizing the
diameter. development cost. From the booster point of view, the technical problems of
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PARALLEL BURN SERIES BURN
979-164 DISCRIMINATORS STRAP ON 979-162
4.574 GLOW (M LBS) 4.627
2.767 BLOW 3.478
1.807 OLOW 1.149
I rBOOSTER COST (SM)
- . 369 DDT&E 379
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ABORT ENG.
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S WORSE FLIGHT
PLUME & HEATING
INTERFACE
WORSE ACOUSTICS
REQUIRES
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22 GROWTH SENSITIVITY 25
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Figure 39 What is the Best SRM Booster?
integrating three SRM's into a tandem stage for a series configuration over- accounts for the minor difference in development costs between 120" and
shadow the attachment and separation problems of parallel mounted boosters, 156" solids, but constitutes the major proportion of production costs,
thus further adding to our preference for the parallel version of the SRM which makes it imperative to minimize the number of solids required for
booster. the program.
Considerable effort was devoted to estimating the cost of developing From our studies of SRM boosters we concluded that:
and producing a solid booster. Cost inputs were received from SRM manu-
facturers and the stage build-up costs developed from detailed manpower, * Parallel solid booster separation should be performed with separa-
material and subcontract estimates. Figure 40 summarizes the buildup of tion rockets
costs from the basic SRM to a fully integrated and tested stage for the case * Booster thrust vectoring should be performed by gimballing the
of a parallel burn 156" solid. We concluded that the motor itself represents nozzles
a relatively small fraction of the total development cost (about 20%), which 0 156" solids are preferable to 120"
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BOOSTER COST (MILLIONS) * Refining the pressure-fed booster design with particular emphasis
ELEMENTS DOTE PROD OPS on ascent control, reentry and recovery as being the major con-
SRM 75.0 2,373.0 figuration drivers
STAGE HARDWYIE * Evaluating the comparative advantages of series vs. parallel configura-
STRUCTURE 19.0 593.7 tions employing liquid propellant recoverable boosters and
PROPULSION 11.3 74.3 * Providing the data required to make a selection between pressure-fed
AVIONICS 2.7 21.1 and pump-fed boosters
POWER 3.9 55.8
SE&I 35.0 .16.5 The optimum method of providing booster thrust vector control
FACILITIES 10.3 for the pressure-fed liquid propellant booster turned out to be liquid
SYSTEMS TEST 24.5 injection rather than mechanical gimballing. (For the pump-fed booster,
GROUND TEST which uses an existing engine, the mechanical gimballing capability of
HARDWARE 14.5 that engine would, of course, be retained). The major considerations
FLIGHT TEST
HARDWARE 15.2
SYSTEM SUPPORT 21.4 110.0 SERIES BURN PARALLEL BURN
MANAGEMENT 11.5 42.8 PRESSURE- PUMP- PRESSURE-
FLT TEST OPS 110.0 FED FED FED
OPERATIONS 379.0 979-176Be 979-073 979-171A
SUBTOTAL 354.3 3,287.0 379.0
TOTAL BOOSTER PROGRAM 4,020.3
DOES NOT INCLUDE SHUTTLE MW AMEXINT
Figure 40 Stage Cost (Parallel Burn - 156" SRM Booster)
* The solid motor cost comprise a small portion of stage development
costs but a major fraction of production costs
* From the booster point of view, parallel/SRM are preferred over
series/SRM systems 
- -
LIQUID PROPELLANT BOOSTERS
The liquid propellant booster systems considered are shown in Figure
41. The study of liquid propellant boosters aimed primarily at:
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for the case of the pressure-fed liquids were the additional weight and chute system at the selected impact velocity of 100 fps, but is simpler and
complexity that mechanical gimbals add to the base structure which lower in cost than a combined system.
would tend to compromise the capability for water impact survival and
The summary comparison between series and parallel liquid propellant
intact recovery. The control study also showed that a combination of booster configurations is shown on Figure 44. From the booster point of
orbiter control surface and booster engine control authority minimizes
view, the situation is very nearly a standoff in both development and per-
the deflection requirements and system weight (see Figure 42). flight costs, but when the overall system is considered, the reduction in HO
For reentry, we concluded that zero rather than high angle of attack tank weight and production cost results in a lower average cost/flight of the
was the preferred mode. This type of reentry assures aerodynamic stability series configuration relative to the parallel burn system by about $300K.
without movable fins and active control systems. The recovery system selec- This cost advantage, coupled with the greater technical difficulties of inte-
ted is one consisting of parachutes only. As shown on Figure 43,!the all grating two parallel mounted boosters rather than a single tandem booster
parachute system is weight competitive with a combined retro-rocket/para- makes us prefer the series configuration in the case of liquid booster systems.
* MAXIMUM PRACTICAL FREON LITVC DEFLECTION IS 50
* GIMBALLING ADDS WEIGHT AND COMPLEXITY TO BASE STRUCTURE AND HEAT SHIELD
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Figure 42 Optimization of Aero Surfaces/TVC Requirement
Allows Effective Use of LITVC
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* WHY ALL PARACHUTE SYSTEM ?
* SIMPLICITY AND LOW COST
* NEAA MINIMUM WEIGHT
* LARGE PARACHUTE CLUSTERING WITHIN SOA
REQUIRED DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IS
STRAIGHT FORWARD
o NO MAJOR IDENTIFIABLE DESIGN OR
DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINTS
o MINIMIZES VEHICLE STRUCTURAL PENALTY
* SELECTED SYSTEM
o 3- 70 FT DIAMETER DROGUES 0 STAGING VELOCITY 5,500 FPS
o 6 - 165 FT DIAMETER MAINS 0 BOOSTER WT
BLOW 4,276,200
INERT 773,400 (BOTH)
250 - MINIMUM WEIGHT PENALTY * BOOSTER COST ($M)
FALLS WITHIN 70- 130 FPS B/L
IMPACT VELOCITY DDT&E - 1,158
200 - ALL RETRO INSTALLATION PER FLT - 2.6
N HO TANK
.10 SERIES BURN
4 '4
-PARACHUTE SYSTEM50 ---
PARACHUTE/
ROCKET
SYSTEM
0 50 100 150
INIMPACT VELOCITY (FPS
A STAGING VELOCITY 5,000 FPS
* BOOSTER WT
Figure 43 Recovery System Selection BLOW 5,032,900
INERT 881,800
* BOOSTER COST ($M)
We investigated in some detail the design and cost aspects of a pump- DDT&E - 1,259
fed booster for a series system for comparison with a pressure-fed stage. * HO TANK
The pump-fed, ballistically recoverable booster is shown on Figure 45.
INERT WT 64,900 LBSCompared to the pressure-fed device, its inert weight is over 350K lb lower
and its gross liftoff weight about 1.4M lb lower. One of the major advantages
of the pump-fed booster is the decoupling between the engine and stage de- Figure 44 Series Burn vs Parallel Burn Liquid Boosters
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velopment, since the turbopumps make the engine performance relatively
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT independent of tank pressures. Furthermore, since we propose the existing
VEHICLE F-1 engine for the pump-fed stage, an engine development program is not re-
STAGING VELOCITY 5,300 FT/SEC quired and the development cost and risk is accordingly reduced.
GLOW 4,870,200 LBS
BOOSTER The pump-fed versus pressure-fed issues are summarized on Figure
INERT WEIGHT 520,400 LBS 46, with the check marks indicating the preferred configuration relative to
BLOW 3,625,200 LBS each of the evaluation parameters. We concluded that because of the lower
ORBITER 1,245,000 LBS development risk and cost (by about $500M) and the lower cost/flight
(by about $500K), we prefer the pump-fed to the pressure-fed liquid
propellant booster.
112.4 FT .
33 FT DIA. TO SUM UP
Our booster studies concluded that:
* For solid boosters, parallel/156" is the preferred configuration
* Comparing solids to liquids, the solids have the advantage of lower
development cost, the liquids that of lower cost per flight
ENGINE TYPE IS THE
FORCING ISSUE BEHIND: PRESSURE FED PUMP FED
* ENGINE/VEHICLE INTEGRATION NEW ENGINE VEXISTING ENGINE
DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT INDEPENDENT
DEVELOPMENT
* THRUST VECTOR CONTROL NEW DEVELOPMENT kGIMBALLED ENGINELIMITED GROWTH
* RECOVERY & WATER IMPACT VLOW Is,AND LOW X REOUIRE VHIGH I
s 
AND HIGH A'
HIGH PROPELLANT LOADS RESULT IN SMALLER
SIZE
* TANK FABRICATION HIGH PRESSURES REQUIRED INORMAL TANK
THICK WALLS WALL SIZES
* BOOSTER COST (S IN MILLIONS)
ROT&E S ,1259 V$ 786
COST/FLT $ 2.5 V$ 2.0
Figure 45 Ballistic Recoverable Booster - LOX/RP, Pump-Fed Figure 46 Pressure-Fed vs Pump-Fed Issue
60O1fts
* For liquid propellant boosters, the pump-fed represents the lower
cost, lower risk approach is thus preferred over the pressure fed
machine
The major cost and technical booster issues are summarized on Figure
47.
PARALLEL BRB BRB
SRM SERIES SERIES
PRESSURE FED PUMP FED
BOOSTER DEVELOPMENT COST 0.4 B 1.38 0.8B
POTENTIAL LOW COST/FLIGHT
DEVELOPMENT RISK
PROPULSION
RECOVERY
SYSTEM FLEXIBILITY
ORBITER/BOOSTER
INTERFACE COMPLEXITIES
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Figure 47 The Issues
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PAD ABORT
One of the major concerns of this final study period was the evaluation the booster/HO tank caused by either uncontrollable over-pressurization
of the implications of providing pad abort capability. We considered the sub- or by fire. This occurrence would generate a blast-wave having the charac-
ject sufficiently important to devote a separate section to a discussion of what teristics shown on Figure 49, which depicts the overpressure (delta-p over
we did, why we did it and what we found out about pad abort. atmospheric) conditions at the altitudes and times indicated. For the purpose
of our pad abort studies, we assumed a 20% TNT equivalence of the baseline
WHAT REQIREMENTSARE WE TRYING TOMEET? series/BRB combination of propellants. The delta-p = 3.0 psi dashed line
To determine the system requirements for pad abort capability, we represents the maximum overpressure the orbiter is considered to be capable
systematically postulated all the failures which could require pad abort. of withstanding without sustaining damage that would prevent a successful
We then evaluated the criticality of each of the failure conditions to es- glide return to the landing strip. (Later studies showed that this value might
tablish which ones would impose the most severe requirements on the pad be increased to 4 psi with a small structural penalty.)
abort system. The results of this evaluation are summarized on Figure 48. Since abort capability improves as the ability to accelerate away from
We found that the most time critical failure would be an explosion of the source of the blastwave increases, we looked into the maximum g
Prior to Post
Liftoff Liftoff
BRB/HO Feed Sys/Eng - Fire/Explosion Most Critil Meet Critd
Rupture of Propellant Lines ? Rapid Escape
Overpressure of Booster or HO Tank Non-Time Critical Not Time Critical
Inadvertant Release of Restraint System Time Critical Time Critical
at Engine Ignition at Engine Ignition
Loss of an Outboard Engine Time Critical
Guidance and Control Time Critical
Solid Booster Fails to Start Non-Time Critical
Solid Booster Burn Through Time Critical Time Critical
Solid Booster Nozzle Failure Time Critical
TVC Failure (Solid) Time Critical
Figure 48 Failure Criticalities
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CONFIGURA TION APPR OA CHES
Series BRIB 20% Effective*
ries e= 2.78 100 Effective The approaches considered for providing pad abort capability are shown
10% Effective \ = 1.22 i / on Figure 51. The configurations employing the main orbiter engines to
t = 2.45 Sec provide abort thrust were eliminated after a brief study because:/ AP= 2.5 psi
t = 2.9 Sec;AP= .. 0 psi / 
t 1.P5S
AP= 3.0 pi
3100 l o SSME Start Up Delay = 2Sec
t =1.12Sec \t =1.85Sec
AP=3.15 ps AP= 3.0 psi 9t .95 \AP= 3.0 ps SAaPx Overpres=0pre
t = .24 Sec Warning. AP=4.psie
t AP= 29 psi Time Sec Payload
4 3 2 1 U 1 2 3 4
Used or tudy Distance From Blast, K Ft 6'..Zero P*Used for Study Zero
Figure 49 (5.0 x 106 Propellant Explosion) Blast Wave Characteristics 4
S 2 3 4 5
T/W
loading the orbiter could tolerate if designed in accordance with nominal Figure 50 Warning Time Requirements
requirements plus safety factors. This turned out to be between 4.2 and
4.5g acceleration. The constraint of maximum allowable vehicle accelera-
tion established that we could not escape the wave front without ex- Eonventional
periencing catastrophic overpressure, unless there was some warning of the
incipience of an explosion. The warning time required is plotted as a Abort SRM
function of T/W (or acceleration in g's) on Figure 50. The warning Engine
time for "Max Payload" corresponds to the T/W that would be ob- Orbiter
tained if, at zero payload, the maximum allowable acceleration capability Flyaway Cryogenic
were provided. It is clear that between 5 and 7 seconds of warning time System oMs System
is essential if a pad abort capability is to exist. The bullet designated
"SSME Start up Delay = 2 sec" illustrates the kind of warning time re- Main Engines Internal
quirement necessary if the orbiter engines themselves were to be
utilized to provide the escape thrust. This excessive warning requirement External
was the major reason why the attempt to use the SSME's in conjunction with Sumps
orbiter cryogenic fuel storage as a pad abort system was quickly abandoned. Figure 51 Configurations Considered for Pad Aborts
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* Since only two of the three engines are usable for abort (three
engines do not allow thrust vectoring away from the tank) the [ 1o.I20"
T/W is too low (T/W = 2.56) for effective abort I Thrust Start (S.L.) = 900 K Lb
Thrust Burnout (S.L) = 680 K Lb
164" Isp S.L. = 242 Sec
* The inert weight penalties imposed by the requirement for propel- Burn Time = 15 Sec
lant storage on the orbiter are effective for the entire mission as Chamber Press (Avg) = 900 psia
102" Total Impulse = 11.7 x 106 Lb-Secopposed to the abort rocket system, in which the unused inert .. Inert Weight = 10,721 Lb
weight can be jettisoned at or before booster staging I- 5" Propellant Weight = 48,838 Lb
Total Weight = 59,559 Lb
We selected for detailed study a series/BRB stack with two orbiter Mass Fraction = 0.82
versions - one a conventional orbiter with two abort rockets strapped to the Figure 53 Abort SRM Characteristics - Swing Engine Configuration
aft end of the fuselage above the wings - the other a swing engine orbiter
with a single abort rocket mounted in the cavity in which the engines are
normally stowed after orbit insertion. The abort rockets for these orbiters We concluded from our configuration studies that both approaches
were sized to provide the maximum allowable T/W for a zero payload launch to providing pad abort capability were feasible, but that the swing engine
and to provide the impulse to impart sufficient energy to the orbiter for a configuration had a number of advantages relative to a conventional
orbiter. It permits the use of a single rocket and provides a convenientglideback to the proposed new landing strip at KSC (825 fps at a burnout
mounting location for it and it eliminates the concern about propellant line
altitude of 6600 ft). The characteristics of the abort SRM's which meet
these requirements are shown on Figure 52 for the fixed-engine orbiter and disconnect clearance for abort separation of the orbiter from the tank. Fur-
on Figure 53 for the swing-engine orbiter. thermore, since it allows a more efficient HO tank design (with the L02
tank aft) it results in a lower GLOW configuration. Figure 54 summarizes the
major weight increments of the swing engine orbiter configuration relative
50" 2 Motors Required to the baseline for both the no-pad-abort and pad-abort cases. Note that
although the swing engine orbiter is somewhat heavier than the baseline,
Thrust Start (S.L.) = 500 K Lb the improvement in tank efficiency more than overbalances the orbiter
Thrust Burnout (S.L.) = 380 K Lb
325" Isp S.L. 242 Sec weight penalty to the extent where, even with pad abort capability, the
Burn Time = 14.6 sec swing engine system is lighter than the no-pad-abort baseline.
Chamber Press. (Avg) = 1400 psia
Total Impulse S.L.= 645 x 106 Lb -Sec WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF PRO VIDING PAD ABORT CAPABILITY?
60, Inert Weight = 6 K Lb
Propellant Weight = 26,700 Lb.
Total Weight = 32,700 Lb. The weight penalties for implementing pad abort capability, shown on
Mass Feracion = 0.82 Figure 55, are on the order of 200-300K lb. in GLOW and 20-30K lb.
Figure 52 Abort SRM Characteristics in total inerts.
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TO SUM UP
* The most critical pad failures for intact orbiter recovery were
orbiter/booster explosion
* The use of SSME was not considered effective; SRM's were
selected for baseline and swing engine orbiters
No Pad Abort Pad Abort * The swing engine provides:
Series BRB Swing Series Swing
Baseline Engine ORB Engine Convenient abort rocket location
A Landed Weight, Lb 0 +54 +840 +2056 - Simple orbiter/tank interface (no propellant lines-safer)
A HO Tank Dry Weight, Lb 0 -6698 +549 -6051 - Minimizes pogo potential
AGLOW, K Lb 0 -204 +237 -10 * For the baseline BRB, pad abort adds approximately:
60-65K lb inert weight to stagingFigure 54 Pad Abort - Series BRB - Swing Engine 60-65K lb inert weight to staging
- 250K lb GLOW
800 lb orbiter dry weight
GLOW for Pad Abort 6.60 4.82 6.35 * Cost increases by approximately $250M DDT&E, $030M per
GLOW for No Pad Abort 6.36 4.52 6.16 flight
.3 GLOW * Pad abort is feasible but will complicate design effort
GLOW .30
.24
AWeight, M Lb .19
GLOW/Inert
.14.72 4.97 4.92
Inert 
.02
0. .03 No Abort UlSeries Parallel Swing - 7.39 7.45
BRB SRM Engine 7.07
All Pad Abort Configurations
Sized for 5% Payload Margin Ser BRB Ser BRB Swing
Press. Press. Eng Ser
Fed Fed + Press.
Figure 55 A Weight GLOW/Inert for Pad Abort No Abort Fed +
Abort Abort Ser BRB Ser BRB SwingPress. Press. Eng Setr
The cost impact is shown on Figure 56. Based on Apollo experience Fed Fed + BRBI
No Abort Press.
Total Prog Abort
development cost penalty for providing pad abort capability. The cost per $B 9.35 9.77 9.71
flight increase is about $300K, the major portion of which is the cost
of the abort rockets. Figure 56 Pad Abort Cost Comparisons
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SYSTEMS EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our overall system evaluation and comparison was generally confined Per/SRM Par.SRMSer/BRB
to those configurations which survived the pre-screening applied in each of 15 x 60 Orbiter 15 x 60 14 x 45
the study areas discussed previously. For the case of series/BRB baseline, Press. Fed Pump Fed 156" 1205
we did, however, consider both pressure-fed and pump-fed boosters, and for
the representative 14x45 orbiter configuration we used the 120" rather than
the 156" booster stack as having the lowest development cost of all options
studied. The factors used for evaluation were the usual cost elements:
development, per flight and total program; technical factors related to design
complexity; inflight abort capability, severity of induced environment Lowest Total Program Cost, 9.35 8.66 10.46 10.39
and control of the combined configuration; and the impact on the environ-
ment. Lowest DDT&E, $B 4.72 4.23 3.85 3.79
Lowest Cost/Flight, SM 7.07 6.62 13.1 13.1
The results of our evaluation were summarized on Figure 6, which is
reproduced here for the reader's convenience as Figure 57. We have check- Least Complex Design
* LeastAcoustic impact
marked the configurations which we consider the best performers relative
to each of the evaluation factors used. * Eaiest Ascent Control
Least Environmental Impact HCL
The lowest total program cost system turned out to be the series/
pump-fed BRB configuration. This is the consequence of the lowest
Figure 57 Configuration Comparison Summarycost/flight combined with relatively low development cost of a system
using that type of booster. If only DDT&E are considered, the parallel/
SRM configurations are the best performers, with the small payload
bay orbiter showing only relatively minor reduction in development cost, cost than the pressure-fed. This is attributed to the fact that the pump-fed
however, as compared to the standard orbiter/parallel/SRM system. Cost booster, employing only four high thrust engines, has a smaller base
per flight favors the series systems, since the recoverability of the liquid crossectional area than the 7-engine pressure-fed booster, thus allowing
propellant boosters significantly reduces the out-of-pocket costs for each use of a deployable shield for engine protection at water impact and a
launch. The pump-fed booster system exhibits a somewhat lower launch commensurate reduction in refurbishment cost.
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In the technical areas affecting design complexity, the series systems LIQUIDS
are generally superior. The control problem is simpler, since the roll moments,
which pose the most stringent control authority requirements, are lower. * On balance, we prefer the series liquid boosters for shuttle
The acoustic and thermal induced environments are more benign, since the development opting for the lowest cost per flight as vital to
orbiter engines are not fired during combined ascent boost. The series system the future of the program
abort capability is somewhat better because the orbiter T/W at equivalent * Between liquids, the pump-fed booster has the right combina-
energy-levels is higher, but neither system has an abort gap. tion of cost/risk/performance
The parallel solid systems do exhibit an adverse environmental impact PAYLOAD
characteristic in that they generate HCI as a combustion product, but the
total amount of the pollutant is very small compared to that produced 0 Most cost reduction benefit is derived from payload weight re-
throughout the world by industrial operations, duction of 20K rather than inert weight reduction of orbiter
* Balance of orbiter is difficult; bay needs 50 ft length with
Based on the above evaluation, our conclusions and recommendations 3 x 472 SSME's or lower thrust engines (3 x 380K) must
can be summarized as follows: be provided
be provided
* If we must minimize DDT&E, reduce payload requirement first, -
but hold on to 60 ft bay
SRM's
PAD ABORT
* All SRM's have lower DDT&E but higher cost per flight than
recoverable liquid boosters * Can be achieved, but as on previous programs will compound the
* All SRM applications make program potentially more sensitive design effort
to environmental issue * Will increase cost per flight by 300K
* On the basis of higher cost/flight, SRM's appear less attractive 0 Let's make sure we understand all implications before we proceed
than liquids over the long haul. For the lowest costs during with requirements
development, SRM's are preferred, but the shuttle program 0 Swing engine is preferred arrangement for pad abort - minimizes
becomes more vulnerable on the environmental issue cost to system
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